The New Borders of the Constitutional by Anderson, Gavin W.
Osgoode Hall Law Journal
Volume 50, Issue 3 (Spring 2013)
Rights Constitutionalism and the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms
Guest Editors: Benjamin L. Berger & Jamie Cameron
Article 10
The New Borders of the Constitutional
Gavin W. Anderson
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons
Special Issue Article
This Special Issue Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Osgoode Hall Law Journal by an authorized editor of Osgoode Digital Commons.
Citation Information
Anderson, Gavin W.. "The New Borders of the Constitutional." Osgoode Hall Law Journal 50.3 (2013) : 737-762.
http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol50/iss3/10
The New Borders of the Constitutional
Abstract
The key critical constitutional debates of the future are likely—and need—to be very different from those that
animated the Charter’s first thirty years. Since 1982, the borders between law and politics, rights and utility,
and the public and the private have staked out the main territory contested by critical scholarship. However,
these borders now demarcate a restricted landscape, drawing critics onto the ground of normative debate
preferred by liberal theory, and leading them to propose, at best, a form of moderate pragmatism. A more
promising approach lies in reconnecting constitutional debate to the socio-historical strand of critical theory,
as represented by the emergent school of constitutional sociology, and in developing this connection in light
of the insights of postcolonial studies. The new borders of the constitutional are located between those
approaches that accept the epistemological framework of modern Western constitutionalism, and those that
make that framework the object of critical inquiry.
Keywords
Canada. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms; Constitutional law; Canada
This special issue article is available in Osgoode Hall Law Journal: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol50/iss3/10
737
The New Borders of the Constitutional
GAVIN W. ANDERSON *
The key critical constitutional debates of the future are likely—and need—to be very different 
from those that animated the Charter’s fi rst thirty years. Since 1982, the borders between 
law and politics, rights and utility, and the public and the private have staked out the main 
territory contested by critical scholarship. However, these borders now demarcate a 
restricted landscape, drawing critics onto the ground of normative debate preferred by 
liberal theory, and leading them to propose, at best, a form of moderate pragmatism. A more 
promising approach lies in reconnecting constitutional debate to the socio-historical strand 
of critical theory, as represented by the emergent school of constitutional sociology, and in 
developing this connection in light of the insights of postcolonial studies. The new borders 
of the constitutional are located between those approaches that accept the epistemological 
framework of modern Western constitutionalism, and those that make that framework the 
object of critical inquiry.
Les principaux débats critiques de l’avenir sur la constitution seront probablement—et  devront 
être—fort différents de ceux qui ont animé les trente premières années de la Charte. Depuis 
1982, la frontière entre droit et politique, droits et utilité, et domaines public et privé ont 
constitué le champ principal de contestation des chercheurs critiques. Ces frontières 
délimitent toutefois désormais un panorama restreint, ce qui amène les critiques sur 
le terrain d’un débat normatif qui privilégie les théories libérales et les pousse à proposer, 
à tout le mieux, une forme de pragmatisme modéré. Une approche plus prometteuse 
consisterait à rétablir le lien entre le débat constitutionnel et le fi l socio-historique de la 
théorie critique, comme le représente l’école émergente de la sociologie constitutionnelle, et 
à mettre en œuvre ce rétablissement à la lumière des acquis des études postcoloniales. Les 
nouvelles frontières de la constitutionnalité se situent entre ces approches qui acceptent le 
cadre épistémologique du constitutionnalisme occidental moderne et celles qui font de cette 
structure l’objet d’un questionnement critique.
* School of Law, University of Glasgow. An earlier version of this article was presented at the 
inaugural Osgoode Hall Law Journal Symposium, “Canada’s Rights Revolution: A Critical 
and Comparative Symposium on the Canadian Charter,” Osgoode Hall Law School, York 
University, Toronto (14 September 2012). I would like to thank the participants at the 
Symposium for their helpful and stimulating comments on an earlier draft, and in particular, 
Jenny Nedelsky, for her insightful commentary. I also wish to express gratitude to the guest 
editors, Benjamin Berger and Jamie Cameron, for their careful reading of the original paper, and 
for the supportive manner in which they have overseen the publication of this special edition.
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IN CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATE, critical fears and liberal hopes 
appear to combine in questioning the viability of a critical constitutional 
enterprise. For critics, constitutional law is regarded as unpromising ground 
from which to attack unequal power relations and to address the task of social 
reconstruction. In the classic tension between the constituent power of the 
demos and the power that is already constituted in institutional form, the latter is 
seen as overdetermining the former, ensuring that constitutionalism remains 
pre-committed to maintaining the existing order.1 From a liberal perspective, 
the most trenchant account of the ideological shortcomings of prevailing 
constitutional forms must ultimately address the question of the normativity 
of constitutional law.2 Moreover, it is argued that doing so necessarily brings critics 
inside the constitutional fold, requiring them “to engage seriously in setting 
out the proper relationship between the legislature, the administration and the 
judiciary.”3 On either count, the cost of constitutional engagement is a dilution 
of critical ambition: In place of radical manifestos, the best we can now expect is 
some version of moderate pragmatism.
Th ese theoretical concerns have considerable resonance when we refl ect upon 
the thirty years since the Charter of Rights and Freedoms4 was enacted; from a critical 
point of view, this anniversary is in many ways the most acute and troubling. It 
is only as liberal bills of rights become embedded over the longer term that the 
full scale of the critical predicament becomes apparent. Th is is generally obscured 
during two earlier phases of critical scholarship. Th e fi rst phase is characterized 
1. See Emilios Christodoulidis, “Against Substitution: Th e Constitutional Th inking of 
Dissensus” in Martin Loughlin & Neil Walker, eds, Th e Paradox of Constitutionalism: 
Constituent Power and Constitutional Form (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) 189 
at 191.
2. David Dyzenhaus, “Th e Left and the Question of Law” (2004) 17:1 Can JL & Jur 7 
[Dyzenhaus, “Th e Left”].
3. Ibid at 30.
4. Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11.
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by ex ante opposition to the very idea of an entrenched bill of rights. Th is 
opposition rests on principled and consequentialist objections to judicial, as opposed 
to political, decision making. Th e second phase arises once the bill of rights is 
in force, with critical theory operating in an “I told you so” mode, vindicating 
its initial scepticism in light of the dismal record of constitutional adjudication. 
However, as bright-line questions of legitimacy that critics sought to keep to 
the fore gradually recede through the attrition of time, we enter a third phase in 
which critics face the reality of a bill of rights as a fact of constitutional life. Th e 
transition to the third phase crystallizes the dilemmas facing critical scholars. If 
they choose—as some leading voices of the fi rst two phases have done—to vacate 
the constitutional stage, they risk irrelevance in an age of constitutional rights; 
however, if they advocate an unmediated return to politics, as others appear to 
do, they potentially align themselves with an unsavoury populism and with some 
unlikely fellow travellers.5 According to David Dyzenhaus, the only viable option 
remaining for critics is to abandon concerns about co-option and to work within 
the rule of law to advance their own theory of judicial review.6
In this article, we question the conclusion that the zenith of critical 
constitutionalism has passed. While agreeing with Dyzenhaus that the transition 
from the second to the third phase has posed signifi cant diffi  culties for critical 
theorists, we off er here a diff erent diagnosis of these problems. In particular, we 
argue that the borders over which the initial theoretical encounters of the Charter 
era were conducted delineated a somewhat constricted landscape—moreover, one 
whose pathways led critics directly onto the horns of Dyzenhaus’s dilemma. Th ese 
borders principally marked out the opposition between legal and political forms 
of constitutionalism, and while initially a fruitful source of critical inspiration, 
they can now be seen as self-limiting in narrowing the scope of the constitutional 
debate. Th is dynamic in the second phase ensured that the substantive terms of 
debate in the third phase were conducive to liberal interests and that protagonists 
were drawn, methodologically, onto the latter’s favoured normative terrain. Th ese 
metaphorical borders also have an important territorial dimension.7 Namely, it 
is assumed without comment that these debates take place within the bounds of 
modern constitutionalism as it has developed in the West—more specifi cally, in 
5. Dyzenhaus, “Th e Left,” supra note 2 at 8.
6. Ibid at 9.
7. I am grateful to Mark Tushnet for raising this point at the inaugural Osgoode Hall Law 
Journal Symposium, “Canada’s Rights Revolution: A Critical and Comparative Symposium 
on the Canadian Charter,” Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto (14 
September 2012). 
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the Canadian nation-state—and that this is the frame of reference within which 
critical resources are to be located.
Th e central argument of this article is that in order to overcome the constraints 
imposed by these assumptions, critical scholarship has to relocate itself to more 
fertile surroundings and reorient constitutional debate around a diff erent set of 
borders. To that end, we propose two ways in which the critical perspective may 
be expanded. Th e fi rst is to eff ect a shift away from the normative preoccupation 
of present-day scholars by exploring the relevance for the critical dilemma of 
the recent sociological turn in the constitutional literature. Th is applies to 
the constitutional context the (so far underdeveloped) socio-historical strand of 
critical theory that seeks to “relat[e] law to underlying historical interests and 
structures of power.”8 While there has been a tendency for proponents of 
normative and sociological approaches to talk past each other,9 we argue here 
that the interface between the two now provides a key source of critical tension.10 
However, it is crucial that this methodological development also transcend the 
geopolitical borders of Western constitutionalism. Th us, a second innovation 
proposed here is to adapt the sociological approach by examining the ways in which 
postcolonial studies can contribute to a reformulated critical constitutionalism. Th is 
brings directly into constitutional focus the implications of the insight elaborated 
by scholars such as Michael Asch and James Tully that the legacy of colonialism 
implicates the metropolitan West as much as its far-fl ung former and present 
colonies.11 As such, the crucial divide that the new borders of the constitutional 
emphasize is between those who broadly accept the epistemological framework of 
modern Western constitutionalism and those who seek to make that framework 
the object of critical inquiry. Th e prospects for generating a fourth phase, which 
would reinvigorate the critical project, depend on the latter repositioning itself to 
the second half of this divide.
Th e structure of this article is as follows: Part I revisits the fi rst thirty years 
of Charter scholarship; demarcates the three phases so far of the critical variant 
8. Alan W Norrie, Law and the Beautiful Soul (London, UK: GlassHouse Press, 2005) at 6.
9. Ibid at 1. See also Martin Loughlin, Public Law and Political Th eory (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1992) at 58-62.
10. See Chris Th ornhill & Samantha Ashenden, eds, Legality and Legitimacy: Normative and 
Sociological Approaches (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2010) at 7-12.
11. See Michael Asch, “Governmentality, State Culture and Indigenous Rights” (2007) 49:2 
Anthropologica 281 at 283; James Tully, “On Law, Democracy and Imperialism” in Emilios 
Christodoulidis & Stephen Tierney, eds, Public Law and Politics: Th e Scope and Limits of 
Constitutionalism (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008) 69.
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thereof; and sketches the borders between law and politics, rights and utility, 
and the public and the private, which have been the principal focus of its 
engagement. Part II locates the diffi  culties facing critical scholars in the wider 
setting of debates within critical theory and, with reference to the key distinction 
between metaphysical and socio-historical approaches, argues that the general 
neglect of the latter within constitutional discourse in large part explains those 
diffi  culties. Part III assesses the potential relevance of the emergent school of 
constitutional sociology for debates in critical constitutionalism and lays out 
the principal diff erences between that school and the normative method in 
constitutional scholarship. In Part IV, we develop constitutional sociology in 
the light of postcolonial studies and posit the new borders of the constitutional.
I. THE BORDERS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL: FROM PHASE 
ONE TO PHASE THREE
In an article published at the time of patriation, Roderick Macdonald provided 
a prescient analysis of Charter scholarship’s likely course, which pays revisiting 
thirty years on.12 Indeed, from our present vantage point, the article can be seen 
to provide a conspectus of the past, present, and future of critical theory’s 
engagement with a constitutional bill of rights. In charting the fi rst phase of 
scholarship in 1982, Macdonald observed that as the Charter’s entrenchment 
became a fait accompli, pre-enactment opposition seemed to have been replaced 
by a certain quiescence on the part of constitutional theorists. However, 
noting that philosophical writings may take longer to gestate, he sought to assist 
that process by distilling eight propositions from the pre-enactment debate as a 
prelude to reformulating them as a framework for developing theoretical debate. 
Th ese propositions were:
• that an entrenched Charter is an illusory guarantee of fundamental 
rights;
• that entrenchment is foreign to the Canadian constitutional tradition; 
• that an entrenched Charter is incompatible with parliamentary 
supremacy; 
• that Charter litigation will compromise the independence and 
impartiality of the courts;
12. “Postscript and Prelude – the Jurisprudence of the Charter: Eight theses” (1982) 4 Sup Ct L 
Rev 321.
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• that the Charter discriminates between diff erent categories of rights; 
• that the Charter reinforces the power of lawyers and the ideology 
of legalism; 
• that the Charter favours the political and economic theory of the 
minimal state, and;
• that the Charter provides protection for fundamental freedoms only 
against encroachment by the government.13
Macdonald suggested that Charter scholarship should be carried out by 
those who reject the basic premises off ered both in support of and against these 
propositions, and should instead embrace a via media. Th us, for example, his 
analysis of the fi rst proposition leads to the thesis that the Charter should be seen 
as just one aspect of the justifi cation of civil liberties in Canadian law, and should 
not become a proxy for the need to advance a “comprehensive justifi cation of 
fundamental rights claims.”14 We will return to the signifi cance of this approach 
for the diffi  culties encountered by critical scholars in the third phase discussed 
in the Introduction. However, it is important fi rst to pause and refl ect on the 
extent to which these propositions seem to preordain the second phase of 
critical scholarship. Far from the air of resignation Macdonald detected in 1982, 
the decade and a half following the Charter’s passing witnessed a reinvigoration 
of constitutional critique animated by, and structured around, the affi  rmation of 
the arguments outlined above. 
Overarching, and embodied to varying degrees by the propositions, are three 
classic dichotomies around which the main themes of critical constitutional 
scholarship have coalesced: namely those between politics and law, between 
utility and rights, and between the public and the private. Taken together, these 
divides establish the borders over which the opening constitutional skirmishes of 
the Charter era were fought. It is the attempt to renegotiate these borders while 
retaining them as the framework of inquiry that proves problematic as critical 
scholarship contemplates the transition to the third phase. To place this 
discussion in context, we turn now to map the principal contours of these 
borders and to examine how critical theorists have positioned themselves in relation 
to them.
In highlighting the divides enumerated above at the start of the Charter era, 
critics sought to diff erentiate themselves from mainstream scholars in a number 
13. Ibid at 324-25.
14. Ibid at 329.
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of important respects. First and foremost, they focused upon the relation 
between the Charter and prevailing power relations in society. As such, rather 
than seeing a bill of rights as largely “a legal instrument to be evaluated from 
a juridical perspective,” it was regarded instead as “a political instrument to be 
evaluated from an ideological perspective.”15 In contrast with scholarship that 
assumed the Charter could promote justice and freedom and that concentrated 
on how constitutional doctrine could better advance those ideals, the primary 
objective for critics was to keep questions about the Charter’s (lack of ) legitimacy 
very much to the fore.16 Th us, the distinctive feature of a critical approach is that 
rather than maintaining debate within the prevailing rules—compatible with the 
view that the Charter is, if not the optimum, the best available constitutional 
arrangement in the circumstances—it strives to keep debate open over the rules.17 
In particular, this debate considers whether this arrangement should include an 
entrenched bill of rights.
Interrogation of the borders between law and politics, rights and utility, and 
the private and the public was to play a pivotal role in pursuing this goal of 
foregrounding the question of (il)legitimacy during the second phase of Charter 
scholarship. In this connection, critics staked out a position that sought to show 
that the liberal side of the border, where the emphasis was upon law, rights, and 
the private, was, contrary to Charter rhetoric, supportive of hegemonic interests. 
As such, rather than placing legal constraints on unacceptable political practices, 
the Charter was said to entail the legalization of politics, where decision making 
in the judicial arena produced victories for the already powerful that could not 
necessarily have been secured through majoritarian politics.18 Moreover, critics 
saw the particular form of rights-based argument employed by legalized politics 
as the basis for undermining hard won advances in social welfare, which had 
reversed historic power imbalances.19 Following from this, they found that the 
15. Andrew Petter, Th e Politics of the Charter: Th e Illusive Promise of Constitutional Rights 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010) at 7. See also Joel Bakan, Just Words: 
Constitutional Rights and Social Wrongs (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997) at 5 
[Bakan, Just Words].
16. See Allan C Hutchinson, Waiting for Coraf: A Critique of Law and Rights (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1995) at 20-24 [Hutchinson, Coraf].
17. James Tully, “Th e Unfreedom of the Moderns in Comparison to their Ideals of 
Constitutional Democracy” (2002) 65:2 Mod L Rev 204 at 218.
18. See Michael Mandel, Th e Charter of Rights and the Legalization of Politics in Canada, revised 
ed (Toronto: Th ompson Educational, 1994) [Mandel, Legalization of Politics].
19. For an overview of the various strains of rights scepticism, see Adam Tomkins, “Introduction: 
On Being Sceptical about Human Rights” in Tom Campbell, KD Ewing & Adam Tomkins, 
eds, Sceptical Essays on Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) 1 at 6-7. See 
(2013) 50 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL744
importance placed on protecting the individual’s private sphere by means of legal 
rights resulted in the immunization of signifi cant concentrations of private, 
especially economic, power from mechanisms of public accountability.20
Th e critical orientation to the law/politics, rights/utility, and private/
public divides rests fi rst in the conviction that egalitarian understandings of 
social justice are better served by the second part of each coupling. Th us, political 
mobilization is preferred to litigation,21 open-ended assessments of social issues 
to the “dyadic”22 reasoning of rights, and expansive conceptions of public power 
to anti-statism.23 However, the critical orientation also rests in the argument that 
the various separations that liberal constitutional theory seeks to draw are 
incoherent. Accordingly, the liberal attempt to subject politics to law unravels 
when it is understood that relocating political decisions to judicial fora does 
not make them any less political. Similarly, critics attack the contrast between 
principled rights adjudication and policy-oriented majoritarian decision making 
by showing how consequentialist concerns inform both, giving content to the 
contingent form of constitutional rights.24 Th ey also depict the public/private 
divide as arbitrary and unstable, with the public seen simultaneously as a threat 
to private freedom, but also as its ultimate guarantor.25
It is important to note that while these arguments have as their ultimate 
objective to reopen debate over the Charter’s legitimacy at a meta-level, they 
do not together constitute some alternative meta-theory of constitutionalism; 
instead, they critique particular failings of Charter jurisprudence. Th e ultimate 
objective of this approach would presumably be realized when the accumulation 
of these shortcomings reached some critical mass. Crucially though, the liberal 
reply to this charge sheet has also been to respond at the level of particular 
indictments rather than to revise the liberal commitment to an entrenched bill 
of rights. Accordingly, in response to the attack on judicial objectivity, it adopts 
the insight that the obverse of the legalization of politics is the politicization of 
law.26 Th is insight fi nds expression in constitutional theories that emphasize the 
also Bakan, Just Words, supra note 15.
20. Allan C Hutchinson, “Mice under a chair: Democracy, courts and the administrative state” 
(1990) 40:3 UTLJ 374.
21. Harry Arthurs, “Constitutional Courage” (2003) 49 McGill LJ 1.
22. Bakan, Just Words, supra note 15 at 47.
23. Ibid.
24. Hutchinson, Coraf, supra note 16 at 35.
25. Ibid at 134-36.  
26. See Martin Loughlin, Sword and Scales: An Examination of the Relationship Between Law and 
Politics (Oxford: Hart, 2000) at 209.
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dialogue between courts and legislatures under a bill of rights, thereby acknowledging 
the necessary value-judgments involved in carving out the appropriate bounds of 
judicial and legislative decision making.27 Th e argument that rights obscure deeply 
political choices behind a priori assertions of natural law has been countered by 
underscoring the inherently argumentative nature of rights adjudication within 
liberal constitutionalism.28 In this vein, any priority accorded to rights is not on 
account of their transcendent rationality but is only ever the revisable outcome 
of liberty being weighed against competing, and on occasion normatively more 
compelling, considerations, including the need to address social and economic 
inequality.29 In connection with critique of the constitutional public/private 
divide, this approach acknowledges that a line-drawing exercise is involved, and 
so is by nature a construction. Accordingly, the task is to adduce persuasive, but 
necessarily “political and temporary”30 arguments as to where the line should be 
drawn, which, absent a presumption in favour of negative liberty, can also bring 
about the publicization of the private.31
Th e point here is not to endorse these liberal responses, but to lay the 
groundwork for some of the pressing issues facing critical scholarship as it 
enters the third phase. Th is phase is characterized by a general reduction in direct 
attacks on the legitimacy of entrenching rights and by a reluctant acceptance 
that, notwithstanding the vigour of the critical enterprise, the Charter is now 
“the only game in town.” Th is shift in attitudes forces critics to refl ect on whether 
their original hostility was to liberal constitutionalism tout court, or to its 
specifi c instantiation in the Constitution Act, 1982. For some critics, it is important 
to preserve their pristine opposition to any form of constitutionalism,32 while for 
others, more fertile ground is sought at the comparative33 or transnational34 level. 
For other critics though, the key consideration is pragmatic: Even if far from 
ideal, rights constitutionalism cannot simply be wished away, and it remains 
27. See Kent Roach, Th e Supreme Court on Trial: Judicial Activism or Democratic Dialogue 
(Toronto: Irwin Law, 2001).
28. David Dyzenhaus, “Recrafting the Rule of Law” in David Dyzenhaus, ed, Recrafting the Rule 
of Law: Th e Limits of Legal Order (Oxford: Hart, 1999) 1 [Dyzenhaus, Rule of Law].
29. David Dyzenhaus, “Th e new positivists” (1989) 39 UTLJ 361 at 368-69.
30. Ibid at 371.
31. See Vriend v Alberta, [1998] 1 SCR 493, 156 DLR (4th) 385.
32. See Michael Mandel, “Against Constitutional Law (Populist or Otherwise)” (2000) 34 U 
Rich L Rev 443 [Mandel, “Against Constitutional Law”].
33. See Ran Hirschl, Towards Juristocracy: Th e Origins and Consequences of the New 
Constitutionalism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004).
34. David Schneiderman, Constitutionalizing Economic Globalization: Investment Rules and 
Democracy’s Promise (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
(2013) 50 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL746
a key site of democratic struggle.35 On this view, the question is therefore not 
whether, but what constitutionalism. Moreover, to the extent that the liberal 
qualifi cations outlined above are deemed not to satisfy the initial critical concerns 
about constitutionalism’s propensity to propitiate established power,36 the third 
phase can be seen to present an opportunity to develop new modes of engagement, 
which can reconnect constitutional discourse to those concerns.37
Th e concession that the justifi cation for judicial review does not rest in it 
yielding ‘right answers’ in constitutional cases has encouraged a number of critics 
to take up Dyzenhaus’s challenge, outlined in the Introduction, to demarcate the 
appropriate respective jurisdiction of state institutions. However, in contrast with 
liberal approaches to this issue, critics emphasize two key diff erences. First, the 
objective is to reclaim legitimacy for legislative decision making and so to recover 
some ground lost at the time of entrenchment.38  Secondly, there is an attempt to 
spell out a positive conception of the courts’ role within a constitution in which 
the balance has been shifted back towards legislative power—for example, that 
this role should be restricted to the enforcement of “absolute” rights rather than 
the interpretation of “qualifi ed” ones.39 A further noteworthy feature of the third 
phase has been the preparedness of some critics to eschew a former wariness with 
regard to proff ering their own account of the interpretation of constitutional 
rights.40 Th is development seems driven by greater acceptance of the instrumentality 
of rights talk41 and by the desire to steer this talk towards diff erent—civil libertarian 
or social democratic, rather than classical liberal—ends.42 One crucial avenue for 
this approach is to recast the relation between rights and utility in the context of 
35. Allan C Hutchinson, “Th e Rule of Law Revisited: Democracy and Courts” in Dyzenhaus, 
Rule of Law, supra note 28 at 196.
36. Petter, supra note 15 at 142-44. 
37. In the following passage, we also draw on debates relating to the Human Rights Act 1998 
(UK), c 42 where, perhaps due to the absence of a prolonged second phase, debate within the 
third phase is most developed.
38. Petter, supra note 15 at 152-57. A corollary of Petter’s argument is that dialogism exacerbates 
the courts’ lack of democratic credentials by removing, as a justifi cation for judicial review, 
the argument that judges arrive at correct decisions by applying principled reasoning: “By 
accepting judicial interference with democratic decisions in the absence of such an assurance, 
dialogue theory shows itself more willing to compromise democracy than its … predecessors” 
(Ibid at 143).
39. Adam Tomkins, “Th e Role of the Courts in the Political Constitution” (2010) 60:1 UTLJ 1.
40. See e.g. Conor Gearty, Principles of Human Rights Adjudication (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2004).  
41. Conor Gearty & Virginia Mantouvalou, Debating Social Rights (Oxford: Hart, 2011) at 22.
42. Ibid at 88.
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the public/private divide43 where, for example, it has been argued that ideas of 
social and economic rights should be extended into the sphere of private law in 
order to address the latter’s failure to meet the demands of distributive justice.44  
Th e liberal modifi cations, together with the absence of critical intensity that 
characterized the second phase, may be evidence of the relative success of the 
critical agenda in permeating constitutional discourse.45 No doubt the current 
state of debate would be quite diff erent without that intervention; however, here 
we propose a diff erent reading of events, namely that the move to the third phase 
indicates a major shift in critical ambition. Rather than seeking to transcend the 
law/politics, rights/utility, and public/private borders, the forms of engagement 
outlined above reaffi  rm them, in the process closing down room for critical 
manoeuvre. More signifi cant than the liberal concessions is critical acceptance 
of some judicial circumscription of legislative activity, some priority of rights, and 
(particularly when in civil libertarian mode) some value in protecting the private 
sphere. Th is has a number of consequences. First, it opens critics to the charge 
that their previous stance against the viability of such an exercise was incoherent.46 
Second, and more crucially, it moves critical argument onto the ground of its 
erstwhile liberal opponents as critics now seek to redraw the borders with politics, 
utility, and the public respectively, rather than to transcend them. But once 
critics engage in the task of line-drawing, they are always subject to the argument 
that the line could be located in a diff erent place—for example, closer to the law/
rights/private pole. Moreover, the counter-arguments elicited maintain debate 
fi rmly within the parameters of liberal constitutionalism, requiring a substantive 
account of the very rights that were formerly the object of critique.47 Perhaps 
most tellingly, the critics’ principal technique can now be deployed against them; 
critique becomes a powerful weapon in liberal hands to show why, internal to the 
critics’ own standards, the various lines that they themselves now propose could, 
and should, be drawn diff erently.48
43. See Hirschl, supra note 33 at 127.
44. See Hugh Collins, “Utility and Rights in Common Law Reasoning: Rebalancing Private Law 
Th rough Constitutionalization” (2007) 30 Dal LJ 1.
45. See Mark Tushnet, “Survey Article: Critical Legal Th eory (without Modifi ers) in the United 
States” (2005) 13:1 J Pol Phil 99 at 100.
46.  Hamish Stewart, Book Review of Th e Politics of the Charter: Th e Illusive Promise of 
Constitutional Rights by Andrew Petter (2011) 61 UTLJ 540 at 542.
47. See e.g. Hirschl, supra note 33 at 126-27.
48. Alison Young’s engagement with Conor Gearty’s work, while specifi c to the UK context, 
provides a helpful insight into the risks attendant on the critical enterprise in the third phase. 
See Alison L Young, “A Peculiarly British Protection of Human Rights?” (2005) 68:5 Mod L 
Rev 858.
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To be clear, the foregoing passages should not be read as criticism of those 
who try to steer a diffi  cult course in testing times. Rather, our objective has been 
to invite refl ection on the direction that critical scholarship has followed over the 
past thirty years, on why this was the case, and on whether this could have been, 
and could yet be, otherwise. In this regard, the normative turn that characterizes 
the third phase could be seen as indicative of a critical resignation, affi  rming 
Dyzenhaus’s analysis that critics will eventually return to the internal fold of the 
rule of law. We will, though, contest the conclusion that the most that we can 
expect, following the move to the third phase, is pragmatic moderation, rejecting 
excesses of enthusiasm and scepticism, as apparently foretold by Macdonald in 
1982. However, before doing so, it is important to deepen our understanding 
of the nature of the diffi  culties facing critics upon entering the third phase by 
mapping the positions taken in debates on the Charter onto some key fault lines 
within critical theory more generally.
II. THE BORDERS OF CRITICAL THEORY: BETWEEN THE 
METAPHYSICAL AND THE SOCIO-HISTORICAL
In adopting a perspective internal to liberal constitutionalism’s own framework of 
inquiry, critical Charter scholarship follows the long-standing tradition of immanent 
critique. Writing in the context of international law, Susan Marks suggests that 
this approach can be distinguished from “mere ‘criticism.’”49 For Marks, the 
latter evaluates facts in terms of their failure to correspond to external standards, 
whereas critique “juxtaposes the immanent self-understanding of its object to 
the material actuality of this object.”50 Critique seeks not just to explain, but also 
to change the world by “waking it from its dream about itself.”51 Th e critical 
constitutional stances taken up with respect to the various borders under discussion 
can be characterized as directed towards that goal. Th us, the supposedly objective 
nature of judicial decision making is compared to the actual political vectors 
determining its outcomes.52 Against the idea that rights provide neutral baselines 
49. Susan Marks, Th e Riddle of All Constitutions: International Law, Democracy and the Critique of 
Ideology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) at 25.
50. Ibid (quoting Seyla Benhabib).
51. Ibid (quoting Karl Marx).
52. Examples of this argument in the literature are too numerous to catalogue. Prominent among 
them is the claim that language rights litigation should be seen as less about the protection 
of individuals’ freedom of expression than about the shoring up of the interests of the 
economically powerful (see Mandel, Legalization of Politics, supra note 18 at 144); or that the 
Supreme Court’s ‘vulnerable groups’ doctrine often resulted in the protection of those with 
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for debating competing (and presumptively valid) visions of the good society, 
the substantive uses to which they are put in closing off  redistributive political 
options are outlined.53 Additionally, it is the courts’ attempts to demarcate the 
Charter’s public zone of application from its private sphere of protection that 
are deconstructed to show that any supposed bright line between the two is 
inherently malleable, and could always be otherwise.54
According to Emilios Christodoulidis, the principal objective of immanent 
critique should be regarded as producing “rupture,” whereby the various 
contradictions identifi ed—for example, that the liberal preference for law cannot 
expunge politics from constitutional adjudication—are transcended, not clarifi ed 
or restored.55 However, as we have detailed, the story of the Charter so far has not 
been one of rupture, but rather one that is fraught with the danger of critics being 
“absorbed, integrated or co-opted”56 into the liberal constitutional discourse that, 
in the fi rst phase, they initially sought to oppose, and indeed to replace. Th is reality 
may in part be attributed to a lack of tactical nous in seeking to make advances 
through their opponents’ preferred mode of engagement. However, there is more 
to the critical impasse reached in the third phase than liberals simply being better 
versed in the art of toe-to-toe normative combat, and there is the growing suspicion 
that the form of immanent critique undertaken to date itself embodies some 
strategic weaknesses.
To consider what these might be, and how they could be addressed in the 
present context, it is helpful to introduce a distinction drawn by Alan Norrie 
between metaphysical (or ethical) and socio-historical approaches to critical 
theory. His point of departure is to unpack Jacques Derrida’s account of a 
“‘critique of law’ that is ‘possible and always useful.’”57 Echoing the discussion 
in the Introduction, the object of this critique is to uncover “the superstructures 
of law that both hide and refl ect the economic and political interests of the 
dominant forms of society.”58 Th is, for Norrie, represents the nub of a socio-
historical critical theory; in practice, though, he fi nds that Derrida (and others) 
adopt what he describes as a “metaphysical-ethical” approach, which is more 
concerned with applying deconstructive techniques to the intrinsic structures 
of law. For Norrie, this “deeper critique” comes at a cost: To the extent it is 
most economic and social power (Bakan, Just Words, supra note 15 at 98-100).
53. See Hirschl, supra note 33 at 153-68.
54. Hutchinson, Coraf, supra note 16 at 134.
55. Emilios Christodoulidis, “Strategies of Rupture” (2009) 20 Law & Critique 3 at 6.
56. Ibid at 5.
57. Norrie, supra note 8.
58. Ibid.
(2013) 50 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL750
developed on a stand-alone basis, it “does not relate deconstruction as an ethical 
project to the ‘possible or useful’ socio-historical project.”59 His reading of the 
history of critical theory is that the socio-historical approach has been—unfairly—
marginalized by its metaphysical successor.
Th e diffi  culties identifi ed above during the third phase can in large part be 
linked to critical scholarship becoming increasingly distanced from the socio-
historical approach; we canvass here what may be gained by re-establishing this 
connection. Th at is not to say that deconstructive analyses have not been 
eff ective weapons in the critical armoury, particularly during the second phase. 
However, elevating the metaphysical approach as the principal or sole critical 
modus operandi can also, more signifi cantly, be seen as undermining attempts to 
engage in the task of reconstruction. Th ere is a tendency within critical theory for 
deconstruction to be viewed as a means of critique in and of itself,60 with the 
critical task achieved once a particular doctrine, such as the public/private divide, 
is analytically worked over and dissected. Th us, while directed to highlighting 
and disturbing the contradictions of liberal constitutionalism, there is a real risk 
that the deconstructive approach in fact sustains the object of its critique. Th is 
occurs when the frame of debate over the contradictions takes on an existence of 
its own, apart from the social forces that produced them (and that they continue 
to serve). In this context, the various poles of the contradictions become reifi ed, if 
not ossifi ed, with the resultant debate oscillating between them. In other words, 
in the absence of a socio-historical understanding, the metaphysical approach 
can be seen as prefi guring the normative turn adopted by critics during the 
third phase.
Th e concern underlying the foregoing is that, taken to its conclusion, the 
metaphysical approach can disable attainment of the objective underpinning 
immanent critique, namely to remake the world. Th ere is an attendant danger 
here of discounting narratives of social emancipation through a “celebratory 
post-modernism” where the groundlessness revealed by deconstruction leads to 
“disenchantment” with any reconstructive political project.61 In this regard, Norrie 
commends a sociologically informed approach to legal theory, which mediates 
between the “autonomisation of law” propounded by liberals and the reductionism 
59. Ibid.
60. See Alan Hunt, “Th e Th eory of Critical Legal Studies” (1986) 6:1 Oxford J Legal Stud 1 
at 32.
61. See Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Toward a New Legal Common Sense: Law, Globalization, 
And Emancipation, 2d ed (London, UK: Butterworths, 2002) at 18 [Santos, Common Sense].
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of metaphysical critique.62 On this approach, law is viewed as an historical practice 
operating “through particular forms and mechanisms,” which themselves are 
“related but irreducible to broader social relations.”63 Th is emphasis on the 
specifi city of law in its social setting both counters the abstraction characteristic 
of the metaphysical approach and reconnects critique to the task of uncovering 
alternative futures within the contingency of what the present conjuncture 
“represses” as well as “represents.”64 As such, the sociological approach should 
not be equated with a positive descriptivism, with the former’s critical purchase 
obtained through the “ethical standpoints [that] emerge historically in society.”65 
Moreover, it counsels against erecting a sharp divide between discourse and 
practice and instead regards the theoretical and the social as “inseparably 
intertwined,” with ideas and the prevailing economic and social conditions 
constituting a mutually productive relationship.66
In the remainder of this article, we consider the implications of extending the 
socio-historical approach to critical theory in the specifi c context of debates 
on constitutionalism. We suggest that the new borders of the constitutional 
will not be formed by drawing fresh lines across familiar territory, but will 
rather be staked out over quite diff erent ground. Applying the sociological method 
enables us to interrogate how far the critical assault on liberal constitutionalism 
left unexamined—because it shared them—a number of crucial assumptions 
about the framework for conducting constitutional debate. A major consequence 
of this line of inquiry is to undermine the presumed singularity of the 
normative enterprise: As a result, the key question for debate shifts from what 
constitutionalism?—a question decided by competition amongst normative 
principles—to why constitutionalism?—a question requiring “sociological 
explanations of the grammar of legitimacy in constitutional laws.”67 Th is crucial 
move, it will be argued, lays the foundations for the fourth phase of critical 
constitutional scholarship, which reconnects with the original, transformative 
motivations of critical theory. Moreover, redirecting our focus to this 
question shows that the scope of the fourth phase is necessarily broader than 
62. Norrie, supra note 8 at 29.
63. Ibid at 30.
64. Ibid at 4.
65. Ibid at 6-7.
66. Ibid at 19. Norrie elaborates that the intellectual ideas of any given period are themselves 
“mediated and redirected according to the preoccupations of the here and now” (ibid at 20).
67. Jiří Přibáň, “Constitutionalism as Fear of the Political? A Comparative Analysis of Teubner’s 
Constitutional Fragments and Th ornhill’s A Sociology of Constitutions” (2012) 39:3 JL & Soc’y 
441 at 458 [Přibáň, “Comparative Analysis”].
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before, no longer addressing the role that constitutional discourse plays in 
particular Western societies, but also its wider geopolitical context. To set 
the groundwork for this argument, we now advert to some recent pioneering 
scholarship, which has sought to map out the implications of the sociological 
method for constitutional theory.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL SOCIOLOGY
Over the past few years, an innovative body of research has emerged, which for 
some embodies a distinct school of “constitutional sociology,”68 and which has 
gone some way to redirecting the inquiry to what it is about constitutionalism 
that explains its continuing salience for the distribution of power in society. Th is 
school self-consciously diff erentiates itself from the normative deductivism 
associated with Enlightenment theorists of constitutionalism, and so rejects the 
idea that the primary task of the constitutional scholar is to rationalize those 
principles that best govern the operation of political institutions, their relations 
with each other, and with citizens. While this deductivist approach was the 
predominant mindset of the post-1945 explosion of constitutionalism, it is said 
to hinder comprehension of the motivation behind the enduring recourse to 
the constitutional form as a means of “producing, restricting and refi ning”69 
political power. Enhancing this understanding, according to Christopher Th ornhill, 
recovers a “proto-sociological perspective,” which raises the “most profound questions” 
about “the political conclusions that supported the normative doctrines of the 
Enlightenment.”70 Th us, against the ostensible triumph of liberal normativism, 
there may be another story to be told.
Adopting a functionalist outlook, Th ornhill attributes the appeal and 
longevity of constitutions to 
their effi  cacy in enabling societies at once objectively and positively to refl ect and 
control the diff erentiation of their diverse spheres of social exchange, and to simplify 
and consistently to distinguish the complexly interwoven functions resulting from 
their diff erentiated and pluralized evolutionary form.71
68. Chris Th ornhill, A Sociology of Constitutions: Constitutions and State Legitimacy in Historical-
Sociological Perspective (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2011) at 3 [Th ornhill, 
Sociology].
69. Ibid at 11.
70. Ibid at 1-2.
71. Ibid at 13.
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On this basis, the history of constitutionalism is viewed through processes of 
abstraction and generalization of political power, and through its consequent 
transmission into positive (public) law and formal declarations of rights. Crucially 
though, this provides a quite diff erent account of constitutional legitimacy to that 
preferred by normative constitutional theory. Here, legitimacy does not depend upon 
the consonance between political action and an ex ante list of rational precepts.72 
Instead, the legitimacy of constitutional law is inherently contingent, necessarily ex 
post, and attained to the extent that it “facilitates the processes of political abstraction, 
generalization, selective de-politicization and positivization,” which provide the 
conditions under which political power can function effi  ciently.73
We can develop a number of points of interest to the present discussion 
from the sociological turn. First, insofar as sociological analyses emphasize that 
constitutional structures have emerged in response to various societal needs and 
pressures, this Part questions whether it is coherent, as some critics suggest, to 
see constitutionalism and politics as a zero-sum game in terms of the prospects 
for procuring progressive change.74 Regarding “constitutions as institutions of 
structural coupling between law and politics”75 implies that giving up on 
constitutionalism also entails giving up on politics. In other words, as an integral 
part of our collective engagement with social life, the constitutional may 
be inescapable. Moreover, hegemonic forces are always ready to occupy any 
constitutional ground that may be vacated.
Second, the sociological method illustrates how normative approaches 
undermine the initial critical concern with constitutionalism and power by 
distorting the nature of this relationship. Constitutional sociology focuses 
attention on the “functional reality” of political power to emphasize that 
the latter cannot be reduced solely to semantic, theoretical constructions.76 
Rather, there is always a “paradoxical displacement between power and the 
concepts and institutions in which it is vested”; accordingly, we should be 
wary of those normative approaches that regard themselves as providing 
“external and objectively valid descriptions of power and its legitimacy.”77 
72. See Přibáň, “Comparative Analysis,” supra note 67 at 464.
73. Chris Th ornhill, “Legality, legitimacy and the constitution: A historical-functionalist 
approach” in Th ornhill & Ashenden, supra note 10 at 53.
74. See Mandel, “Against Constitutional Law,” supra note 32.
75. Přibáň, “Comparative Analysis,” supra note 67 at 466.
76. Chris Th ornhill, “Th e Future of the State” in Poul F Kjaer, Gunther Teubner & Alberto 
Febbrajo, eds, Th e Financial Crisis in Constitutional Perspective: Th e Dark Side of Functional 
Diff erentiation (Oxford: Hart, 2011) 357 at 373.
77. Ibid.
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Th ese insights appear to direct a renewed critical constitutional project away 
from elaborating the normative principles that should guide political conduct 
and towards a genealogical study of power.78 Th us, a sociological approach is 
attuned to the ways in which power operates through constitutional discourse, 
and in particular to how the conceptual structures generated by normative 
theories are themselves articulations internal to power, reinforcing the 
connections between the theoretical and the social discussed above in this Part.
Th irdly, a sociological approach potentially reconnects constitutional 
scholarship with the distributive aspects of power while avoiding some of the 
pitfalls of the normativist approach encountered during the third phase. It should 
be emphasized again that constitutional sociology is not simply concerned with 
description for its own sake. Rather, moving from the study of “constitutions in 
society” to “the constitution of society”79 focuses attention on how the latter 
distributes power and resources in an asymmetrical manner between a 
“generating centre” and a “receiving periphery.”80 However, any “value consensus” 
proposed or imposed by the centre is potentially limited in its validity.81 In this 
way, the sociological method highlights the danger that the “self-legitimation 
of power through its constitutionalization” might become part of the “general 
tendency to self-justifi cation” and so a means of rationalizing and ratifying the 
status quo.82 In this regard, while eschewing normative approaches in general, 
Th ornhill nonetheless warns that the “re-patrimonialisation of state power” is an 
enduring risk faced by society, which, if not checked, would lead to a signal loss 
of freedom.83 Jiří Přibáň, though, suggests that this stance should not be seen as 
contradictory, but rather as following from the sociological method itself, and 
the method’s emphasis on the dynamic nature of constitutional norms 
producing necessarily contingent outcomes. As such, only constitutional sociology 
can account for the apparent paradox of (some) societies producing high levels 
of liberty while at the same time presiding over ever-greater concentrations of 
power.84 Th us, constitutional sociology relocates questions of validity to analysis 
of “the outcome of the societal functions of normative political forms.”85
78. See Přibáň, “Comparative Analysis,” supra note 67 at 467.
79. Ibid at 465 [emphasis in original].
80. Jiří Přibáň, ‘‘Multiple Sovereignty: On Europe’s Self-Constitutionalization and Legal Self-
Reference’’ (2010) 23:1 Ratio Juris 41 at 51.
81. Ibid.
82. Přibáň, “Comparative Analysis,” supra note 67 at 470.
83. Th ornhill, supra note 76 at 387.
84. Přibáň, “Comparative Analysis,” supra note 67 at 464.
85. Ibid at 465.
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By encouraging refl ection on the limited utility of the normative turn for 
critical scholarship, constitutional sociology provides an important start in gaining 
perspective on the diffi  culties encountered in transiting from the second to the 
third phase. However, there remains concern as to whether this scholarship, as 
it currently stands, is able to ground the development of a fourth phase that 
transcends these limitations. Th is concern rests on two related considerations. 
First, while the sociological method is to be welcomed in shifting the object 
of critical inquiry to concrete outcomes, to the extent that its analysis of these 
outcomes is refracted through examination of the social motives that produced 
the particular institutions of contemporary society, it is potentially circular and 
self-referential.86 Th us, while it does not shy away from discussing the validity 
of constitutionalism’s contingent outcomes, the criteria by which this is to be 
assessed are somewhat elusive, leading to disquiet that the deeply political 
dimension of this enterprise is lost beneath a discourse of effi  ciency. Secondly, 
it is striking that in the present literature the focus of sociological inquiry 
rests almost exclusively upon the development of Western constitutionalism. 
Even when addressing the global context,87 there is a very palpable sense that 
this is an extension of constitutional discourse as it originated in the Western 
nation-state.88 
What is generally underdeveloped in this analysis is the extent to which the 
history of Western constitutionalism can be told as a “story of expansion through 
imperialism,” which in practice entailed the exclusion of “the oppressed voices of 
non-Western cultures.”89 As a result, missing from the discussion is the rich vein 
of scholarship motivated by what it sees as this mindset continuing today, and 
which, with reference to insurgent developments in the global South, argues that 
the key to “reinvent[ing] social emancipation” lies in going “beyond the critical 
theory produced in the North.”90 In the following Part, we assess the potential 
86. See Th ornhill, Sociology, supra note 68 at 7.
87. See David Sciulli, “Societal constitutionalism: Procedural legality and legitimation in global 
and civil society” in Th ornhill & Ashenden, supra note 10 at 103. 
88. See Gavin W Anderson, “Beyond ‘Constitutionalism Beyond the State’” (2012) 39:3 JL & 
Soc’y 359 at 370.
89. Hauke Brunkhorst, “Constitutionalism and Democracy in the World Society” in Petra 
Dobner & Martin Loughlin, eds, Th e Twilight of Constitutionalism? (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2010) 179 at 179.
90. Boaventura de Sousa Santos, “From the Postmodern to the Postcolonial – and Beyond Both” 
in Encarnación Gutiérrez Rodríguez, Manuela Boatcă & Sérgio Costa, eds, Decolonizing 
European Sociology: Transdisciplinary Approaches (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010) 225 at 227.
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rewards to be gained by orienting the fourth phase of critical scholarship around 
an openness to learning from the global South.
IV. TOWARDS PHASE FOUR: CONSTITUTIONAL SOCIOLOGY 
IN POSTCOLONIAL PERSPECTIVE 
Th ere is a tendency within mainstream constitutional discourse, if not to treat 
colonialism as pertaining to a diff erent time and place, then to regard its legacy 
as raising questions of a highly specialized nature of interest primarily to those 
seeking to accommodate cultural diversity. Th is approach, though, has been the 
subject of a sustained challenge within postcolonial studies, which emphasizes 
that modernity should not be regarded as something that originated in the West 
and was brought from there to its colonies, but rather was itself created and given 
meaning through the colonial experience.91 Moreover, in order to understand the 
artefacts of Western modernity, not least constitutionalism, engagement with the 
colonial must no longer be seen as marginal but as “unavoidable.”92 According to 
Boaventura de Sousa Santos, the present global age marks a “return of the colonial,” 
both through the latter’s renewed connections with metropolitan societies, but 
also, perhaps more signifi cantly, as a result of its increasing presence within these 
societies.93 He warns that so long as critical theory retains a narrow, Western-
focused viewpoint and fails to give these developments suffi  cient weight, it risks 
missing some of the key “transformative practices going on in the world.”94 Th us, 
91. Peter Fitzpatrick & Eve Darian-Smith, “Laws of the Postcolonial: An Insistent Introduction” 
in Eve Darian-Smith & Peter Fitzpatrick, eds, Laws of the Postcolonial (Ann Arbor: University 
of Michigan Press, 1999) 1 at 2.
92. Walter D Mignolo, “Th e Geopolitics of Knowledge and the Colonial Diff erence” (2002) 
101:1 S Atlantic Q 57 at 86.
93. “Beyond Abyssal Th inking: From Global Lines to Ecologies of Knowledges” (2007) 30:1 
Review (Fernand Braudel Center) 45 at 55 [Santos, “Abyssal”]. Santos gives as an example 
of the former “the case of the undocumented migrant worker … hired by one of hundreds 
of thousands of sweatshops operating in the Global South subcontracted by metropolitan 
multinational corporations.” Th e latter is manifested by a redrawing of the line between the 
metropolitan and the colonial in response to the colonial “intruding or trespassing on the 
metropolitan spaces” as a result of the former’s now “superior” mobility compared with previous 
eras. Examples of this line drawing are given as the segregation wall in Gaza, and the development 
of the category of the “unlawful enemy combatant” (ibid at 56, references omitted). Santos 
acknowledges that what emerges is a somewhat “messy cartography” (ibid at 57).
94. “Public Sphere and Epistemologies of the South” (2012) 37:1 Africa Dev’t 43 at 48. Th us, 
while sociological analyses have highlighted the ways in which globalization has reinforced 
hegemonic power relations between North and South, and the role which the spread of 
liberal constitutional forms has played in those processes (see Santos, Common Sense, supra 
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at the heart of postcolonial theory is a call for an “understanding of the world 
[that] by far exceeds the Western understanding of the world.”95 Adapting this 
to the present context, we argue in this final Part that any sociology of 
constitutionalism, if it is to contribute to a reformulated critical constitutional 
project, must be located within a sociology of Western modernity itself. Th is 
brings into sharp focus the crucial issue, laid bare once we begin to question 
the necessary equation of constitutionalism with Western constitutionalism, of 
what is at stake in the division drawn by predominant forms of constitutional 
discourse between the constitutional and the non-constitutional.
We can approach the implications of adverting to postcolonial studies for 
critical constitutional theory through the work of Partha Chatterjee on the 
genealogy of political society. In an echo of Macdonald telling backwards the 
history of critical debate under the Charter, Chatterjee suggests that “it is as 
if all the major political developments of the modern world were anticipated, 
indeed foretold, at the birth of modern political theory.”96 Th is is reinforced by 
a “historicizing strategy,” in which politics is conceptualized within a singular 
worldview, regarded as the same everywhere, and taking place simultaneously.97 
This “homogeneous time” is the time-space of Western modernity and is 
characterized by abstraction: It is what people imagine, not where they live. In 
contrast, the time that people actually experience is “heterogeneous, unevenly 
dense.”98 For Chatterjee, the puzzle is the durability of the abstract normative 
theory of empty homogeneous time, notwithstanding the intense struggles over, 
for example, class confl ict and colonialism, which have marked the “real history” 
of past centuries.99
Chatterjee fi nds part of the answer in the development of “norm-deviation 
and norm-exception structures,” which sought to retain the universalist narrative 
of modernity while adapting to the fact of social plurality. Th e norm-deviation 
structure operated at the level of empirical comparison of a particular social 
note 61 at 313-51), they have at the same time drawn attention to ongoing practices of 
resistance, and have sought to engineer a reverse transmission of global power, often captured 
under the rubric of “globalization from below.” See Boaventura de Sousa Santos & César A 
Rodríguez-Garavito, eds, Law and Globalization from Below: Towards a Cosmopolitan Legality 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005).  
95. Santos, “Abyssal,” supra note 93 at 64.
96. Partha Chatterjee, Lineages of Political Society: Studies in Postcolonial Democracy (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2011) at 2 [Chatterjee, Lineages].
97. Partha Chatterjee, Th e Politics of the Governed: Refl ections on Popular Politics in Most of the 
World (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004) at 6.
98. Ibid at 7.
99. Supra note 96 at 3.
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exemplar to a notional mean, while the norm-exception structure informed 
policy, including the possibility of intervention to redress the initial deviation.100 
Th e colonial context is the key to understanding these structures. For example, 
not extending representative government to colonial dependencies would not 
contradict representative government’s status as a universal ideal so long as its 
absence could be attributed to the colonies’ exceptional characteristics (such as 
their lack of readiness for such government at this stage in their history).101 
Homogeneous time maps onto the assumption that modernity should develop 
in a symmetrical fashion, closing down the gap identifi ed by the norm-deviation 
strategy, while heterogeneous time implies a sequential theory of development 
in which the various processes that occurred in Western history need not be 
replicated in other places.102  
Applying Chatterjee’s analysis to constitutional sociology in its current form, 
we can locate within the latter an understanding of the development of Western 
constitutionalism in symmetrical terms. Th us, for example, Th ornhill’s historical 
narrative is one of the unfolding of legal constraints on arbitrary offi  cial conduct, 
leading to political power being organized in ever more functional terms. But 
Chatterjee’s point is that for most inhabitants of the planet most of the time, 
the sequential theory corresponds to their way of life. Th is reality in fact 
raises general levels of arbitrariness as, in response to the pressures of popular 
politics, the persistence of norm-deviation strategies has by now accumulated 
a large number of exceptions.103 Whereas the symmetrical approach sees this 
proliferation of exceptions as a “perversion” of democratic politics, a sequential 
perspective takes it very seriously indeed (as a “potentially richer development 
of democracy”104), and views the “theorization of these improvisations” as a core 
task of postcolonial scholarship.105 For Chatterjee, bringing to light the depth 
and extent of “the real heterogeneity of power relations in society” is central to 
“break[ing] the abstract homogeneity of the mythical time-space of Western 
normative theory.”106 Th e new borders of the constitutional in the twenty-fi rst 
century accordingly coalesce around attitudes to the framework of Western 
modernity, and in particular whether constitutionalism is seen as developing in 
a teleological manner along the lines suggested by the symmetrical account, or 
100. Ibid at 10-11.
101. Ibid at 10.
102. Ibid at 12.
103. Ibid at 19.
104. Ibid at 15.
105. Ibid at 19.
106. Ibid at 22-23.
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whether that assumption itself should be subject to challenge and scrutiny. 
Th e constitutional position of Indigenous peoples in settler societies such 
as Canada provides a powerful example of the critical potential of the second 
option in highlighting the partiality underlying Western constitutionalism’s 
impetus towards symmetry. In an insightful and helpful analysis, Michael Asch 
investigates the legitimacy narratives of the present-day Canadian state. Adopting 
Foucauldian terminology, he identifi es the major problem these narratives have 
had to overcome as the longer-standing “historical-political” discourse of 
Canada’s original inhabitants, the First Nations.107 Th e attempt to do so rests 
on two bases, he argues, by combining the “juridical-philosophical” principle 
of majority rule (“deduced through ‘Reason’” according to the tenets of the 
Enlightenment) with a reformulation of historical-political discourse to claim 
that Canada was not occupied by political society before European settlement.108 
Both fi nd practical expression in the terra nullius doctrine, which continues to 
ground the sovereignty of the Crown. In other words, Canada’s “origin myth” is 
restarted so that it can unfold within the homogeneous time of Western modernity. 
However, as Asch points out, the alternative, and for him more compelling, First 
Nations historical-political discourse continues to get in the way,109 and alongside 
the hegemonizing sway of modern constitutionalism is a story of “resist[ance 
to] the colonial positioning proff ered for us, as citizens and academics, by the 
liberal state.”110 Th e emergence of a distinct theory and practice of Indigenous 
constitutionalism has in this regard provided an important focus for confronting 
assumptions about the singular nature of Western constitutionalism by 
highlighting the latter’s sequential origins through its encounter with non-modern 
constitutional traditions in colonized lands.111
It is important to realize that this challenge to the symmetrical reading of 
constitutionalism goes beyond the immediate postcolonial context. In that 
regard, there is much for refl ection in Asch’s observation that “it will likely 
prove impossible to create a just relationship with First Nations without also 
decolonizing ourselves.”112 Th is statement suggests that a principal objective of 
critical constitutional theory is to uncover other ways in which the assumptions of 
107. Supra note 11 at 282.
108. Ibid at 281-82.
109. For example, Asch notes that Indigenous peoples have remained “reliant for their livelihood 
on the foraging mode of production” so “put[ting] to rest forever the truth-claim proff ered by 
government and capital that they [have] been absorbed by the world economy” (ibid at 283).
110. Ibid. 
111. See John Borrows, Canada’s Indigenous Constitution (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010).
112. Supra note 11.
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uniform societal development underpinning Western modernity (not least 
the view that liberal capitalism represents the optimum form of socio-eco-
nomic organization) also produce highly partial constitutional logics. Building 
on ideas of legal pluralism,113 this approach highlights the power of naming what 
is habitually excluded, and of positing this as an integral aspect of constitutional 
discourse. We can see the potential value of this approach in the context of con-
temporary economic globalization, which critical constitutional analyses have 
characterized as a drive towards worldwide uniformity of neoliberal political and 
economic models.114 However, expanding the constitutional canon to include 
those normally marginalized brings widespread practices of resistance, often lo-
cated outside institutional milieu, into the picture,115 showing that as well as its 
top-down, hegemonic dimension given priority in the literature, global constitu-
tionalism can also operate in a bottom-up, insurgent mode.116  
To return to Dyzenhaus’s dilemma, we can now see that the old borders, 
which he assumes as the necessary framework for debate, do not exhaust the 
options for critical scholars. Accordingly, the new borders of the constitutional 
proposed here stake out a broader conception of constitutionalism implied by its 
alternative histories, as outlined above. Th e task of harnessing this conception to 
a diff erent constitutional future is neither easy nor straightforward; the critical 
dilemma retains its power by speaking to deeply embedded ideas in the Western 
constitutional mindset. Moreover, since what is being recovered is itself a 
critique of the existing vocabulary of Western political and constitutional 
theory, we cannot resort to a further refi nement of its well-established principles. 
Doing so would undo the advances of constitutional sociology. Chatterjee 
himself suggests a potential way of reconciling wariness over the normative 
nature of constitutional discourse with critique of the power relations sustained 
by dominant readings of Western modernity within that discourse. He asks, 
“Could the accumulation of exceptions justify a redefi nition of the norm?”117 
In that regard, a critical research agenda in part seeks to overcome the limits of 
113. See e.g. Martha-Marie Kleinhans & Roderick A Macdonald, “What is a Critical Legal 
Pluralism?” (1997) 12:2 CJLS 25. In an interesting coda to the earlier discussion, it is 
noteworthy that Macdonald’s scholarly trajectory since his 1982 article on the Charter itself 
refl ects a sociological turn, and has played a leading role in bringing to light the asymmetries 
endemic in “everyday law.” See Macdonald, Lessons of Everyday Law (Montreal: McGill-
Queen’s University Press, 2002).
114. See Schneiderman, supra note 34.
115. See Santos & Rodríguez-Garavito, supra note 94.
116. See Anderson, supra note 88 at 380-83.
117. Lineages, supra note 96 at 24.
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exclusively institutional analyses by depicting the actual practices of governance 
where colonial and postcolonial struggles are played out.118 It also addresses the 
possibilities of valorizing the asymmetrical and the marginal within current 
institutional fora; there may be much to be learned in this regard from recent 
developments in Latin America where courts are seen by social activists as one 
(sometimes useful) tool among many in advancing their various struggles.119 
Th us, it is the fact of divergence from the norm assumed by Western theory, 
not the norm itself, which provides the basis for evaluating the ‘validity’ of the 
contingent outcomes of modern constitutionalism. 
V. CONCLUSION
Over twenty years ago, while commenting on critical scholarship’s general 
distrust of normative legal argument, Mark Tushnet suggested that normative 
discourse could one day be replaced by “something like sociology.”120 In this 
article, we have taken up Tushnet’s challenge, to argue that a sociological outlook 
is vital to the task of renewing critical constitutional theory in demanding times. 
Th is argument highlights the imperative of repositioning critical theory around 
new borders of the constitutional that bring to the fore the question of what 
was not debated within the old borders that can now be included within the new. 
Th is entails an appraisal of the extent to which critical theory had previously 
assumed a framework of inquiry that left in place the hegemonic reading of 
Western modernity. Perhaps the most striking feature of debate under the old 
borders was the belief, by liberals and critics alike, in modernity as “the story of 
reason circumscribing power,”121 and in the ability of constitutional law to bring 
this about, once fastened to the requisite normative co-ordinates. If such an 
approach reinforced a singular account of modernity, then the pressing challenge 
for critical theory is to bring to light developments that refl ect ideas of multiple, 
or even counter, modernities. One such opportunity takes up Chatterjee’s 
observation that “diff erentiated citizenship” is now empirically the norm for most 
societies, even in the West.122 For some, the attendant move away from modernist 
conceptions of political equality is not a cause for concern or regret but to be 
118. See Asch, supra note 11 at 283.
119. See César Rodríguez-Garavito, “Beyond the Courtroom: Th e Impact of Judicial Activism on 
Socioeconomic Rights in Latin America” (2011) 89 Tex L Rev 1669 at 1676.
120. Mark V Tushnet, “Th e Left Critique of Normativity: A Comment” (1992) 90:8 Mich L Rev 
2325 at 2330.
121. Shai Lavi, Yishai Blank & Roy Kreitner, “Introduction” (2007) 8:1 Th eor Inq L 1 at 1.
122. Supra note 96 at 24.
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welcomed as an opening in rights discourse towards “the exploited, the excluded, 
the nonequals.”123 Another promising avenue is the potential role of globalization 
from below in providing the elusive agency for transformative constitutional 
practice.124 Th e precise direction in which this takes us will be established in 
the years to come; however, it is clear that for any critical constitutional project 
to fl ourish, it is important that this takes us beyond the “confi nes of modern 
constitutionalism.”125
123. Enrique Dussel, Twenty Th eses on Politics (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008) at 122.
124. See e.g. Santos, Common Sense, supra note 61 at 465-71.
125. David T ButleRitchie, “Th e Confi nes of Modern Constitutionalism” (2004) 3:1 Pierce L Rev 1.
